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This article argues that what Charles Olson called objectism was not the mere 
rehashing of objectivist poetics, as has sometimes been supposed, but 
involved the working out of a position that was diametrically opposed to 
objectivism, with respect both to objects in the world and objects in the poem. 
Central to objectism was what I call here the rule of interchangeability. It is 
this principle of interchangeability, I argue, that both grounds poetry’s open 
form and frees up its dynamic relational energy. In the second half of the 
essay I consider how these findings bear upon the poetry through detailed 





Charles Olson Changes Objects: 
A Reinterpretation of Projective Verse 
This essay considers the nature of the object in the work of Charles Olson: 
how do Olson’s objects differ from those of Ezra Pound, William Carlos 
Williams and the so-called objectivists and does the difference matter? 
Consider, to begin with, this key passage from the second half of 
‘Projective Verse’: 
Which gets us to what I promised, the degree to which the projective 
involves a stance towards reality outside a poem as well as a new 
stance towards the reality of the poem itself. It is a matter of content, 
the content of a Homer or of Euripides or of Seami as distinct from that 
which I might call the more ‘literary’ masters. From the moment the 
projective purpose of the act of verse is recognized, the content does—
it will—change. If the beginning and the end is breath, voice in its 
largest sense, then the material of the verse shifts. It has to . . . It is no 
accident that Pound and Williams both were involved variously in a 
movement which got called ‘objectivism.’ But that word was then used 
in some sort of necessary quarrel, I take it, with ‘subjectivism.’ . . . 
What seems to me to be a more valid formulation for present use is 
‘objectism,’ a word to be taken to stand for the kind of relation of man 
to experience which a poet might state as the necessity of a line or 
work to be as wood is, to be as clean as wood is, as it issues from the 
hand of nature . . . 
 It is in this sense that the projective act, which is the artist’s act 
in the larger field of objects, leads to dimensions larger than man . . . 
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 It is projective size that the play, The Trojan Women, possesses, 
for it is able to stand, is it not, as its people do, beside the Aegean.1  
The objectivists emphasized the objectification of the poem—the making of 
the poem into a literary object that would have, as a form, the solidity, the 
necessity, the ‘rested totality’ (‘to which the mind does not wish to add; nor 
does it’),2 of those traditional forms (what Olson calls ‘inherited line, stanza, 
over-all form’)3 that Pound and his followers abandoned. But as Louis 
Zukofsky insisted, the objectivists’ poems were to be no less crafted than 
those inherited forms. This was the primary meaning of objectification: 
reification, the making of a definite thing. We can find another succinct 
expression of Zukofsky’s notions of ‘sincerity and objectification’ in Basil 
Bunting’s punning line: ‘laying the tune frankly on the air’.4 The ‘tune’ is 
redoubled in the musical meaning of ‘air’, while ‘frankly’ recalls sincerity—
with the suggestion also of someone franking the air.5 The paradox of solidity 
in air also recalls Yeats’s ‘I made it out of a mouthful of air’ (my emphasis).6 
There was no doubt a deliberate provocation, as Olson recognized, 
about Zukofsky’s use of the term ‘objectification’—with its connotations of 
what George Oppen called ‘the psychologically objective in attitude’7—to 
mean something like poetic form, just as there was a provocation in using the 
term ‘sincerity’ to stand, broadly speaking, for content. While Olson might 
share the objectivists’ emphasis on craft (his evocation of the line as carved 
wood recalls, for example, Pound’s frequent images of what Donald Davie 
called ‘the poet as sculptor’8 or the recurrent image in Briggflatts of the poet as 
monumental stonemason), what is no less striking is the emphasis on 
‘relation’: objectism stands the poem as object smack-bang in the middle of a 
world of objects, of which the poet himself is equally one—as The Trojan 
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Women stands with its people by the Aegean Sea. We might say, thinking of 
Zukofsky’s term, that the people ‘add’ something to it. Thus, Olson’s stance is 
different from the monumental stance of ‘objectivism’—for we can see now 
that part of what keeps an Olson poem standing is the presence of the world 
of which it is a part; the phenomenon of relation. The poem as object stands to 
attention—or rather stands as attention, in relation. It is in this sense that the 
Olsonion object is not just an object but an ‘act’—an action, doing, 
happening—a fact that changes not only its content (‘it has to’) but the ‘reality 
outside a poem as well’. That ‘larger’ reality (‘the larger field of objects’) is 
what puts the size into ‘projective size’. It also means that the composition of 
Olson’s words on the page is not only a scoring for the voice, as it is for 
example in Zukofsky’s ‘A ‘ or The Cantos, or in Briggflatts or even Discrete 
Series. It is the penetration of the world itself by the work—and so of the work 
by the world. The object is in process, in motion. It adds to itself and it is 
added to. 
The failure to distinguish between objectivism and objectism has a 
good pedigree. It was perpetrated first of all by the objectivists themselves. 
‘The problem remains for the reviewer and for any reader that it is impossible 
to confront Olson’s poems without first of all acknowledging the audible 
presence of Pound in them’, wrote Oppen. ‘Not that Olson has not openly and 
handsomely acknowledged the debt’; yet ‘to encounter Olson’s work’, he 
added, with a pointed allusion to Olson’s association with Donald Allen’s The 
New American Poetry (1960), ‘is simply not an encounter with a new poetry.’9 
Zukofsky himself wrote to Edward Dahlberg that ‘Projective Verse’ was a 
‘steal from my Objectivist issue, etc. bungled up, etc.’10  
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Why did Oppen and Zukofsky get it wrong? The answer may be found 
in a somewhat forgotten essay by Marjorie Perloff: ‘Charles Olson and the 
“Inferior Predecessors”: “Projective Verse” Revisited’. In this relatively early 
essay Perloff gave a forensic and seemingly devastating account of Olson’s 
indebtedness to his predecessors and contemporaries, one that has still not 
been satisfactorily answered by the poet’s admirers. ‘Projective Verse’, Perloff 
argued, ‘is hardly the breakthrough in literary theory it is reputed to be. It is 
essentially a scissors-and-paste job, a clever but confused collage made up of 
bits and pieces of Pound, Fenollosa, Gaudier-Brzeska, Williams, and 
Creeley.’11 Olson’s ‘main deviation from the Pound-Williams aesthetic is that 
he muddles their concepts.’12 As for Olson’s attempt to refine and develop 
objectivist principles, ‘objectism’ (‘as Olson irrelevantly calls it’),13 ‘is merely 
Pound’s “objectivism” in not very new dress.’14  
I argue that Perloff’s account of ‘Projective Verse’ reveals some 
important features of Olson’s essay, which are indeed best seen by looking at 
it coldly—exactly as she does. It’s a reading that is not to be dismissed—
instead we need to ask, as I do with Oppen and Zukofsky, how could one be 
so right and yet still be wrong? But the rightness is important and has been 
overlooked. There were fundamental differences between what Olson 
thought of objects and what the objectivists had thought. Perhaps it obscured 
these differences that Olson was still in the process of making them, working 
through them in poetry and prose. I read ‘Projective Verse’ not as the 
muddled rehashing of the ‘Pound-Williams aesthetic’, for which Perloff 
presents such a sound empirical case, but as an essay governed by intuitions 
that Olson had yet to articulate in comprehensive terms. The essay resists its 
predecessors, on this reading, not because Olson is in denial of his debts, but 
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because he was chasing other intuitions and groping for another formulation; 
if he slings mud, if at times he seems to flail around, it is in the attempt to 
secure a little discursive distance—to find himself space and time to think 
something else. And to think something else is what, in the end, he succeeds 
in doing. He thinks the demystification and dispersion of the poem as an 
object—and in the process demonstrates a concern with embodiment that was 
distinct from anything in Pound or even Williams.15 Objectivism meant, as 
Oppen and Zukofsky agreed, the objectification of the poem—the making of 
the poem into a durable formal object—whereas objectism reflects Olson’s 
concern to move away from such a static conception of form (‘This rested 
totality’, wrote Zukofsky, ‘may be called objectification’),16 to produce a poetic 
object that would move with the world, one object among others. 
In what follows I first enlarge on the argument made above, before 
going on to read some ‘letters’ from The Maximus Poems in the light of this 
reinterpretation of Olson’s epochal essay. 
 
1. Objects 
Perloff seems to be on safe ground when she shows how even Olson’s well-
known description of composition, and the role of the typewriter in refining 
composition, was anticipated by Pound. Olson writes: 
It is the advantage of the typewriter that, due to its rigidity and its 
space precisions, it can, for a poet, indicate exactly the breath, the 
pauses, the suspensions even of syllables, the juxtapositions even of 
parts or phrases, which he intends. For the first time the poet has the 
stave and the bar a musician had.17 
As Perloff shows, Pound had already said something similar: 
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All typographical disposition, placing of words on the page, is 
intended to facilitate the reader’s intonation, whether he be reading 
silently to self or aloud to friends. Given time and technique I might 
even put down the musical notation of passages of ‘breaks into song.’18 
Such atomizing of Olson’s essay is arresting, but it has the weakness of 
overlooking shades of emphasis that linger in the relation of part to part. The 
key word for Olson when discussing composition is not the typewriter, in 
fact, but the breath that the typewriter is intended to indicate. Olson 
‘hammer[s]’ away at ‘the breath, the breathing’:19  ‘If the beginning and the 
end is breath, voice in its largest sense, then the material of verse shifts’;20 
‘breath is man’s special qualification as animal’;21 ‘that place where breath 
comes from, where breath has its beginnings’, and whence ‘all act springs’.22 
Indeed, when Perloff quotes from the passage that includes the phrase ‘And 
the lines comes (I swear it) from the breath, from the breathing of the man 
who writes, at the moment that he writes’,23 none of the three quotations 
Perloff cites as source from Pound and Williams makes mention of ‘breath’.24 I 
should just say here that my purpose at this point is absolutely not to use a 
good critic as a straw man—but rather to draw as close as possible, by way of 
her evidence, to Olson’s ‘proper confusions’.25 The major point is this—
breathing teaches the art of composition because it is prior to it; and only 
because it is prior to it can the art of composition return the compliment and 
not teach us but remind us that we breathe. Pound emphasizes, as Bunting 
and Zukofsky would, the larger possibilities of melodic language when we 
‘break the pentameter’;26 Olson is getting at something more besides—not just 
the basis of rhythm in language but its basis in the breath—in what Creeley 
will call our ‘own phenomenality’.27 To grasp the significance of this we might 
 8 
think of an analogous moment in the history of phenomenology, and the shift 
from Heidegger’s conception of language as the house of being, to Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of the primordial nature of the perceptual body and the 
rapprochement, in his writing, of the body and language.28 
 I want now to turn to Olson’s use of the term ‘object’. Olson uses the 
term ‘object’ to mean at least three things: first, the work of art as object; 
second, ‘those other objects [that] create what we know as the world’;29 and 
third, the human being who ‘is himself an object’;30 and all of these become 
part of what might be a fourth meaning: ‘the larger field of objects’—in other 
words how one object relates to another and how that relation affects what an 
object is. The elasticity and ambiguity in the use of the term ‘object’ both 
reflects and exacerbates ambiguities in the first part of the essay among the 
terms composition, voice and breath (Olson often uses the terms ‘large’ or 
‘larger’ to mediate among them). I suggest that all of Olson’s terms might be 
said to sustain the ‘confusions’ that as Olson says are ‘proper’ to them—and it 
is by way of this confusion that Olson gives himself, and his essay, space to 
think. 
 Problems of definition are central to ‘Projective Verse’, since the essay 
is to a considerable extent an argument with definition as such31—a meditation 
on a certain concept of limitation, inherent for example in our ideas of line 
and form, of the poem on the page. Unlike the theory of objectivism, which 
found both locus and focus in the distinctive nature of the work of art as an 
object among other objects, the notion of projective verse, while it begins with 
the object, also moves (or is moved) energetically beyond it—hence the appeal 
to terms like projective and open, that would project beyond, or open up, the 
borders of the thing.32 In so far as it was a theory at all, objectivism was about 
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the objectification of the poem, the reification of the poem on the page, 
whereas Olson’s notion of objectism situates the poem primarily in the breath 
and only secondarily on the page. Furthermore, while objectivism 
emphasized the poem as object, objectism emphasized all objects as objects 
and the poem as communicative field—something going on between and 
among every element that happens to be there: or there and not there—for, as 
we shall see, most of the things in a projectivist poem are never just in the 
poem; they are also parts of a world—but their participation in the world is 
re-activated in the poem, which produces in us the feeling that they may be 
most in the world by being in the poem, most in the poem by being in the 
world—most there by being elsewhere. 
 The paradox is the familiar one that nothing is just what it seems 
(nothing is frozen in time), but we only get to experience this paradox by 
attending first of all to the thing as it seems to be: ‘that a thing, any thing, 
impinges on us by a more important fact, its self-existence, without reference 
to any other thing, in short, the very character of it which calls our attention to 
it, which wants us to know more about it, its particularity.’33 (I shall follow 
Olson in using the terms object and thing more or less interchangeably. In 
‘Projective Verse’, for example, we move in a few sentences from the ‘secrets 
objects share’, and ‘the artist’s act in the larger field of objects’, to the idea of 
‘a seriousness sufficient to cause the thing he makes to takes its place 
alongside the things of nature’).34 
To work too hard to describe the particularity of the thing, however, is 
always potentially to rob of its energy—to miss the kinetic, the Heraclitean 
motion of everything it is and becomes: 
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The error of all other metaphysic is descriptive, is the profound error 
that Heisenberg had the intelligence to admit in his principle that a 
thing can be measured in its mass only by arbitrarily assuming a 
stopping of its motion, or in its motion only by neglecting, for the 
moment of the measuring, its mass. And either way, you are failing to 
get what you are after—so far as a human being goes, his life. There is 
only one thing you can do about kinetic, reenact it. Which is why the 
man said, he who possesses rhythm possesses the universe. . . Art does 
not seek to describe but to enact.35 
We might summarise Olson’s thought here in the form of a question: what is 
the rhythm of objects or things? The stillness of the poem on the page, that thing 
there, is discovered eventually to move—the poem must be reenacted, its 
rhythm possessed. It begins on the page but when taken up—by the breath—
it enters the field. 
Olson sometimes seems to be saying that the objects in the poem are a 
different kind of object from what he calls ‘those other objects’ in the real 
world: 
It is a matter, finally, of OBJECTS, what they are, what they are inside a 
poem, how they got there, and, once there, how they are to be used . . . 
Every element in an open poem (the syllable, the line, as well as the 
image, the sound, the sense) must be taken up as participants in the 
kinetic of the poem just as solidly as we are accustomed to take what 
we call the objects of reality; . . . these elements are to be seen as 
creating the tensions of a poem just as totally as do those other objects 
create what we know as the world . . . 
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Because, now, a poem has, by speech, solidity, everything in it 
can now be treated as solids, objects, things; and, though insisting 
upon the absolute difference of the reality of verse from that other 
dispersed and distributed thing, yet each of these elements of a poem 
can be allowed to have the play of their separate energies and can be 
allowed, once the poem is well composed, to keep, as those other 
objects do, their proper confusions.36 
By ‘insisting’, as he does, ‘upon the absolute difference of the reality of verse 
from that other dispersed and distributed thing’, Olson might seem to be 
saying that the objects in a poem are, if not less real or less solid, different in 
kind from the things of the world—‘those other objects’: the things in the 
poem can be ‘treated as solids’ but their solidity, like their reality, is of a 
different order. 
The obscurity that emerges here is, I think, a product of the fact that 
Olson wants to avoid the idea of reference altogether—the idea that the 
objects (named) in the poem may be taken to represent or refer to objects in the 
real world.37 He makes the point emphatically several years later, in his ‘Letter 
to Elaine Feinstein’: ‘Representation was never off the dead-spot of 
description. Nothing was happening as of the poem itself . . . It was referential 
to reality. And that a p. poor crawling actuarial “real”—good enough to keep 
banks and insurance companies, plus mediocre governments etc. But not 
Poetry’s Truth’.38 Reference, for Olson, is a ‘dead-spot’, a non-event. Whereas 
truth is something that is always ‘happening’—and should be understood as 
an ‘action’ or a ‘process’. By refusing to say that words refer he implies 
something like what Zukofsky means when he describes poetry as ‘thinking 
with the things as they exist’—thinking with them, not referring to them.39 
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Reference to leaves room for doubt (does the reference work? does the thing 
exist?), whereas ‘thinking with’ treats the thing’s existence as a given. Words 
are ‘handles’40—thinking with them is therefore, as it was for Heidegger, a 
‘form of handwork’.41 And as Olson understands it, poetry is thinking with 
them ‘fast’—at a speed that is to be deemed too fast (‘INSTANTER’) to be 
confused with referencing them.42 The reference has already happened, in the 
blink of an eye—the word, or the poem, has moved on. 
So what does Olson mean, then, by the ‘absolute difference of the 
reality of verse from that other dispersed and distributed thing’? In what does 
the ‘absolute difference’ consist? As Stephen Fredman has said, what makes 
the difference is the energizing process of composition and recognition—
composition that is based on recognition; composition that is activated and 
propelled by it (‘of composition (of recognition, we can call it)’).43 The poem is 
a dynamic assemblage of recognitions, any one of which may be energized at 
any point by all or any of the other recognitions of which the poem is 
comprised. Composition/recognition makes all the difference, releases a 
rhythmical ‘energy which is peculiar to verse alone’.44 Poetry is literally a 
process of recognition—and there can be no end, in the sense of closure, to the 
poem, because there is no end to recognition, or to what might be recognized. 
Or as Robert Creeley puts it: ‘poets[,] among others involved in comparable 
acts’—comparable acts, that is, to the act of writing poems—‘have an intuitive 
apprehension of a coherence which permits them a much greater admission 
of the real, the phenomenal world, than those otherwise placed can allow.’45 
Poetry is not so much a different order of experience, as a recognition of the 
order in experience, as if for the first time—one that also allows the 
phenomenal world to come into its own, to be recognized for what it is.46 
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Yet while it is true that the poet is the one who, in the act of writing, 
composes what he recognizes—traces on the page the rhythm of 
recognition—Fredman seems to oversimplify the matter when he says that 
‘the poet is responsible for creating the entire context in which the objects 
exist and interact’.47 He is thinking of a passage like the following: 
The objects which occur at every given moment of composition (of 
recognition, we can call it) are, can be, must be treated exactly as they 
do occur therein and not by any ideas or preconceptions from outside 
the poem, must be handled as a series of objects in field in such a way 
that a series of tensions (which they also are) are made to hold, and to 
hold exactly inside the content and context of the poem which has 
forced itself, through the poet and them, into being.48 
The poet is out there in the field—there is no composition without his active 
witness—but the ‘content and context of the poem’ force themselves ‘into 
being’; force themselves into the poem. There is a force, an energy, that goes 
by way of the poet, that is unimagineable without him (‘for only he, the man 
who writes, can declare, at every moment, the line its metric and its ending’),49 
but he doesn’t create it, nor create what creates it—say rather that he 
recognizes it and his recognitions (which exceed him) compose it. The whole 
point about projective verse is that if open means what it says (if open means 
open to the world) there can be no end to context. Context will always exceed, 
will always open up onto some space beyond, each finite instance of the 
extension of content into form. In Rosmarie Waldrop’s terms, there is always 
more contiguity beyond what is assembled50—the ‘sea/stretching out’ at the 
‘feet’ of the poem, the ‘undone business’ that encircles, as the sea does, all 
business that is done: 
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It is undone business 
I speak of this morning, 
with the sea 
stretching out 
from my feet.51 
I am reminded of that extraordinary image of Euripides’ play standing by the 
Aegean, for ‘feet’ is surely a metrical pun. ‘Undone business’ is a wonderful 
phrase—suggesting a world of potential activity that is distinct from the 
business (the energy) so far done (composed or ‘held’) in the poem, yet 
touched, energized, at this juncture, by the thought of it. 
 Waldrop has also written of the importance of relations between in 
Olson’s thinking: 
Relation is central to Olson’s view of the universe, not just of poetry. 
Repeatedly, in nearly identical phrases, he insists: ‘At root (or stump) 
what is, is no longer THINGS but what happens BETWEEN things, 
these are the terms of the reality contemporary to us—and the terms of 
what we are.’52 Or he adds: ‘what happens BETWEEN things, in other 
words: COMMUNICATION’53 . . . 
 Olson anticipates or parallels much of what we have more 
recently become aware of through the efforts of semiologists, 
communication theorists, and environmentalists when he stresses 
again and again what happens between things and when he labels it 
communication.54 
This is helpful and important, because what I want to get at is the idea that 
the ‘tension’ that matters in Olson’s work, the projective tension, also has to 
hold between what the poem has said and what remains unsaid—that the 
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energy there, busily between, feeds into such energy as may be captured 
(simultaneously galvanized and registered), by the poem. The poem is not a 
closed circuit, it is an open one—it ranges, like a field. Its reality tends beyond 
itself. 
 For all Olson’s talk of the distinctive nature of poetic reality, this reality 
is necessarily alive with a ‘secret objects share’55—its reality shimmers with a 
larger reality, with what Olson calls ‘projective size’.56 
 As Waldrop recognizes, Olson’s notion of projective verse was more 
than simply a theory of poetics: it was about poetry as ‘a stance toward 
reality’; that is to say, poetry as comportment or a manner of being in the 
world.57 For the projectivist poet, mankind doesn’t stand above what Olson 
calls ‘those other objects of nature’ but alongside them and the openness of 
open form consists in its openness to all such objects. The sheer length and 
spread of The Maximus Poems points metonymically beyond the poems to the 
world of which they are a part. The poem bespeaks a flow between the things 
it comprises and the things it does not: it is an essential feature of the 
projectivist poem that there appear to be nothing on which it might seem to 
shut the door—so that what is included remains open or feels as if it is open 
to what is not included. The ‘stance towards reality’, then, is an open stance. 
But instead of inviting the whole world into the poem, as if the poem might 
contain the world, this ‘stance’ is there to invite the poem into the world—
exactly the other way round. ‘I want, as Charles Olson says, to come into the 
world.’58 A poem has no special claim on the world—rather it is open to the 
claims of the world, as one useful object among others. A poem cannot move 
the world, for the world is already moving. Instead it has to learn to move 
with the world—in time to the world. ‘It is all a rhythm’, in Creeley’s words.59 
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It is this decentering of the poem—as if the poem’s centre were not in 
the poem but in the world—this reconfiguring of the poem’s relationship to 
what is not the poem, that may be said to constitute Olson’s primary 
originality. For Olson, the poem is not to be defined over against the world, as 
it is for Ezra Pound—The Cantos as ironic or elegiac Jeremiad. Maximus 
doesn’t open up a distance between itself and the world—the poem and the 
not-poem, to adapt the terms of Ralph Waldo Emerson;60 it is not enough even 
to say that it tries to close the distance down. Rather it would reconfigure that 
distance—by dispersing it altogether. Now, we can see this beginning to 
happen in the work of Williams: when Williams complains in Paterson of 
‘Minds like beds always made up’ or admonishes us to ‘waken from a dream, 
this dream of/the whole poem’, he is saying that that world that is not the 
poem must be allowed to unmake, or at the very least disturb, what the poet’s 
mind has made; the poem can’t be whole in itself because it rests upon the 
world.61 Olson takes this insight at least one degree further—and here once 
again is his originality: the idea that the poem rests upon the world, that it is 
infused with the energy of all that it is not, is not just a discovery that Olson’s 
poem is in the process of making, as for example Paterson makes it; the world 
is not the sea to which the poem as river flows. Rather the poem is responsive 
to the world in its every syllable (which is why the ‘syllable, king . . .  is 
spontaneous, this way’),62 as if the river and the sea were always already 
interspersed and interchangeable; as if the objects of the poem, the objects 
found in the poem, could in theory be exchanged at any moment, 
energetically, with those ‘other objects of nature’ that appear to have been left 
out. Or to return to Waldrop’s emphasis on ‘between’, we may say that the 
poem exists most meaningfully somewhere between where it is on the page 
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and the world towards which it orientates itself. The real poem (the poem that 
the poem would be) lies between, projects itself between, itself and the world. It 
steps (‘stance’) into the breach. 
 The breath has a special place in all this. For Olson it is the groundbass 
of all rhythm—the one living constant. The breath guides the poet in his 
placing of himself in the world: the poem is what places him, gives him a 
place, brings him, as Creeley says, into the world. The breath tells the poet 
that he is there, or else tells him how to get there. The breath is a proof that 
the ‘high-energy construct’ is working as just that. The poem breathes most 
easily in other words—its rhythm is at its most audible, palpable—when the 
poet has come into the world. Yet part of the proof that the poet has come into 
the world is his not being anywhere to be found: for he leaves the poem to 
breathe in his place. What we find is his breath, which is to say the rhythm of 
his passing through and passing on. The poet comes into the world by 
seeming to depart from it—but what he has departed from is simply the 
poem as a shelter for the ego. Only by thus leaving the poem does the poet 
not so to speak hog the world. If he hangs on to the poem (if he makes the 
poem the scene of his subjectivity as opposed to the scene of his being) he 
only clutches at the world. Another way of saying this is to say that what I 
will call here the rule of interchangeablility, according to which those objects 
referenced in the poem express their relationship to those objects outside it by the fact 
that they are notionally interchangeable with them (i.e. all are of equal value, none 
is privileged; the poem is a perspective rather than a privilege)—an 
interchangeability that is felt dynamically as energy, a tending inwards and 
outwards to and from the poem, from and into the world—applies not only to 
what Olson calls ‘those other objects of nature’ (as distinct from human 
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beings), but also to human beings themselves. The poet loses his ego in the act 
of writing and becomes representative (and interchangeable) man. 
 As I have said, this logic is already implicit in Williams’s Paterson. And 
to that extent Olson’s originality can viewed as a matter of degree: 
‘Projectivist Verse’ is, as Williams recognized, an intensification of the latter’s 
egalitarian logic, a logic that is simultaneously constructive (in the sense of 
‘high-energy construct’) and deconstructive: the energy, figuring outwards, 
tends away from the construct back out into the world to the point where the 
construct, like Heraclitus’s river, only appears to be there—when we engage 
it, it flows into something altogether larger, swifter, and more energetic. 
 Contrary to Perloff, then (and contrary, ironically, to Zukofsky), the 
relationship between poem and world as conceived by Olson and Creeley is, 
despite the differences between these last, fundamentally different from the 
relationship as broadly conceived by more or less objectivist poets like 
Zukofsky, Oppen and Lorine Niedecker. When Niedecker, for example, 
writes ‘what would they say if they knew/I sit for two months on six lines/of 
poetry?’ she imbues the whole poem with the weight and gravity of that still 
and concentrated sitting.63 She stresses the objectification of the poem, that is 
to say the making of the poem into a durable object, on reification in the 
affirmative Arendtian sense of world-making, contributing to the manmade 
things of the world. In the scales of poem and world, the objectivists put 
greater weight upon the poem. Olson and Creeley by contrast ultimately put 
weight upon the relationship between the poem and what Creeley will call 
‘some deeper complex of activity’. The poem, where it is successful, taps into 
that deeper complex of activity and therefore must resist its own tendency to 
reification—in other words to closure. Viewed in this light it is easy to 
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understand why the poetry of Black Mountain might be thought of as post-
modernist—for these poets abandon the idea of the poem as cultural 
monument, an object that stands above and apart, much as practitioners of 
postmodernist prose have been said to abandon the idea of the grand 
narrative.64 Superficially of course, when we open a book of poems by Olson 
or Creeley the monument still appears to be there: but as we immerse 
ourselves in the poetry we see how it attempts to deconstruct its apparent 
autonomy in the name of a relational process. The poem is only there until we 
have learned how to read it. There is a tremendous Romantic impulse at work 
here, inherited from Emerson and the American nineteenth century, as critics 
such as Fredman have observed. The poem seeks to embrace a cosmic 
wilderness, Emerson’s Nature, immediately beyond the frontier of the line—
but this Nature is now conceived in something other than the pictorial terms 
in which Emerson could sometimes appear to conceive it.65 Nature isn’t 
something we see—it is an activity we feel and participate in. 
  
2. Life and Letters 
In the second half of this essay I will try to demonstrate the validity of my 
findings through close readings of two sections from Maximus. ‘Letter 5’ is a 
peripatetic meditation on the relationship between life and poetry, life in and 
out of print. So in its different way is ‘Letter 27 [withheld]’. In both letters the 
image of limit becomes a figure for its exact opposite, for what is illimitable, 
uncontained, no longer bracketed or ‘withheld’. Limits are what one must 
pass through—or in Williams’s words, there is ‘an/interpenetration, both 
ways’.66 
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In the essay ‘Projective Verse’ Olson attacks what he calls ‘that verse 
which print bred’, yet appears to suggest in Maximus that print may suffice:  
A magazine does have this ‘life’ to it (proper to it), does have streets, 
can show lights, movie houses, bars, and, occasionally, 
 
for those of us who do live our life quite properly in print 
 
as properly, say, as Gloucester people live in Gloucester 
 
you do meet someone 
 
as I met you 
 
on a printed page67 
Now, if Olson were merely setting up an analogy here between two different 
forms of propriety, property, appropriateness; or, to put it another way, 
between two different manifestations of belonging—in the sense of what must 
belong to or be a property of x (‘proper to it’) in order for x to be recognized 
as x; an analogy, in other words, between those who belong to the written 
word and those who belong to the life of a locality (a particular time and 
place that is itself a synecdoche for the world at large); between people who 
live ‘in print’—namely writers and especially poets—and people who ‘live in 
Gloucester’; an analogy in effect between the two-dimensional and the three-
dimensional—then he would be guilty of what he emphatically condemns as 
‘comparison . . . or, its bigger name, symbology’: 
 21 
All that comparison ever does is set up a series of reference points: to 
compare is to take one thing and try to understand it by marking its 
similarities to or differences from another thing. Right here is the 
trouble, that each thing is not so much like or different from another 
thing . . . but that such an analysis . . . does not come to grips with what 
really matters: that a thing, any thing, impinges on us by a more 
important fact, its self-existence, without reference to any other thing, 
in short the very character of it which calls our attention to it, which 
wants us to know more about it, its particularity.68 
What alternative might there be to seeing ‘Letter 5’ as proposing an analogy 
or comparison? I take Olson to be saying that to meet someone in print, for 
those of us who live in print, is, by so meeting them, to be projected beyond 
print, into life as such—without inverted commas (‘A magazine does have this 
“life” to it’).69 
As ‘Letter 5’ continues, it becomes clear that print is not and cannot be 
the measure of Olson’s ideal life and polity: 
It’s no use. 
There is no place we can meet. 
You have left Gloucester. 
You are not there, you are anywhere 
where there are little magazines 
will publish you70 
Print is not the measure, because, in the words of ‘Letter 6’, ‘Polis is/eyes’—is, 
that is to say, the sum or field of all fully individuated readers—I’s—and ‘so 
few / have the polis / in their eye’—so few are individuals;71 just ‘the few of 
us there are / who read’.72 It is easy to miss the witty inversion here of the 
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normal order of things: to have a polis in one’s ‘I’, the letter imbued by the 
whole civic body, is more important than to have an ‘i’ (quite literally) in 
one’s polis. 
 Publication is easily corrupted: 
what sticks out in this issue is verse 
from at least four other editors 
of literary magazines73 
Publishing is at best a conduit. What matters is reading and writing—‘the 
attention, and / the care’:74 
I came to your door 
just because I had read a poem by you in just such a little magazine 
as you now purport to edit75 
A poem, a magazine—single items singled out. 
I’ll put care where you are, on those streets I know as well as (or better: 
I have the advantage 
I was a letter carrier, read postcards, lamped checks, talked 
at the back doors 
 
I’ll meet you anywhere you say76 
—‘anywhere’, that is to say, your writing speaks. ‘I can’t get away’, he writes, 
‘from the old measure of care’77—‘I who hark to an older polis’.78 For this 
oldness is part of what he calls ‘the context of / now!’—the space-time of 
living history.79 ‘Your magazine might excuse itself/if it walked on those legs 
all live things walk on’—your magazine might excuse itself, in other words, if 
it moved.80 
 23 
Thus I read the famous lines ‘Limits/are what any of us/are inside of’81 
not simply as an unmixed affirmation of the necessity of humble containment, 
or self-containment, as Fredman does, but as a brilliant repudiation of the 
mind-forged manacles of the magazine mentality—a repudiation of small-
mindedness and publication for publication’s sake.82 Your limits are where 
you find them—what you take them to be. (There is often in Olson the 
suggestion of a subtle congruence among limits, limbs and verse lines—for 
limits, like limbs, are a species of extension as well as definition: ‘The mind, 
Ferrini,/is as much of a labour/as to lift an arm/flawlessly’:83 to lift an arm is 
to write—or, equally, to fish or fly: ‘The nest, I say, to you, I Maximus, 
say/under the hand, as I see it, over the waters/from this place where I 
am/where I hear’—where to ‘hear’, the poem argues, is also to breathe, write 
and see.84)  
Something similar may be said for tradition: 
that tradition is 
 
at least is where I find it, 
how I got to 
what I say85 
The monuments do not form an ideal order, as T. S. Eliot said, they enable a 
finding—of themselves, of oneself, of one’s voice.86 ‘Find’ insinuates both 
field—a field is where you find it, where something is to be found—and its 
rhyme-word mind. It also suggests fin—‘as fine as fins are’—where fin could 
also be taken to mean end, limit, finish; but the word remains unfinished, 
open.87  
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 As Olson’s reader, one finds oneself going around in circles in a positive 
sense: that is how one reads, circling the verse, swooping on this or that, 
navigating the great wing-beats of the pages. The poem becomes one’s field 
(or a field within a field; the one ‘opening’, in Robert Duncan’s word, into 
another)—one’s magnetic habitat.88 
Olson’s portrait of himself as a ‘letter carrier’ recalls a passage from his 
autobiographical essay ‘The Post Office’ (1948) in which he evokes his father’s 
job as a carrier of letters—whose chosen ‘route’ (‘this process of selection’) 
resembles the poet’s field—and the absolute seriousness, the sense of 
responsibility (‘modesty, care, proportion’) with which his father went about 
his work: 
My father was old fashion. He had notions having to do with courtesy, 
modesty, care, proportion, respect. He had them confused with his 
work. A letter, say. He was scrupulous about a letter. He had the idea 
it was somehow important just because it was made up of words (he 
had the notion that words have value, as signs of meaning and feeling) 
and because it was communication between two persons (the idea of a 
person seems to have meant something to him). Thus he took himself 
seriously as the last, and only directly personal agent, of several hired 
by a stamp to see that a letter reached the person to whom it was 
addressed or, rather (as I am sure he, with his notions, would have put 
it) for whom it was meant. 
 As part of such motion he took himself to be responsible.89 
I seem to see here in the image of the letter carrier the figure of the poet—and 
hence of the poem, which is that part of the poet from which his subjectivity 
has been dispelled—as transparent ‘high-energy construct’, of the self 
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reduced to pure agency (‘such motion’), the transport of meanings ‘between 
two persons’; as that agent that bears or carries letters (‘signs of meaning and 
feeling’) and yet is something more than they—the upright, bipedal harbinger 
of the world. 
 
3. Polity 
‘I have this sense/that I am one with my skin’, Olson writes, in ‘Letter 27 
[withheld]’,90 exuding a plump complacence, the fullness of being felt in the 
flesh, that recalls Whitman’s boast, ‘I find no sweeter fat than sticks to my 
own bones.’91 The faith in being that is manifest in what Olson chooses to 
predicate of ‘polis’, the sense of is-ness, is emphatically underlined by the 
iteration of the Ishmael-like ‘is’ in all three words—‘Polis/is this’—a presence 
projected from one word to the next (compare ‘all that I no longer am, yet 
am/. . .//more than I am’, where the word am is also connected, phonetically, 
acoustically, to ‘An American’).92 
 There is a solidity about Olson’s felt conception of being in the world 
that recalls not only Whitman but Williams: ‘Outside/outside myself/there is 
a world,/he rumbled, subject to my incursions/. . ./which I 
approach/concretely’;93 except that for Olson the world that Williams 
‘approach[es]’ is already so much there (always already there, in the jargon of 
phenomenology), that the speaker hardly needs to approach it (‘I come back 
to the geography of it’), before it advances to meet him: ‘forever the 
geography/. . . leans in/on me’ (notice how the e sound of ‘leans’ is picked up 
again in ‘me’ after the subtle, dense—the almost sub-atomic—play of 
prepositions: ‘in/on’), making him ‘a complex of occasions’; a coming 
together, in space, of spaces.94 
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 For Olson, some notion of embodiment, where being there means being 
part, amorphously but indivisibly, of a body that is always more or less 
dynamic, energized, kinetic, on the move, is fundamental to the notion of 
projective verse. Two things follow from this: firstly, that the poem doesn’t 
just lie there on the page—it projects both verse and voice. The consciousness 
that one is an embodied being, the idea that to be properly mindful—to have 
a handle on being—is to live in one’s body, is part of what projective verse 
was about; not only what it was about but an essential element in its 
developing conception of what it was doing, enacting, performing—its 
rightful business. Secondly, far from being merely a restatement or phase of 
objectivism, as has been suggested, projective verse was always peculiarly 
alive to the limitations of the object; seeing as it did that things couldn’t last 
(‘But you see, nothing lasts’95), that they always, willy-nilly, moved and 
therefore changed, became other things, the projective poem could not help 
but have a metaphysical orientation; a commitment to the invisible world—or 
rather to the world in its visible and invisible phases; to the thing as it came 
and went.96 
‘Letter 27 [withheld]’ begins with a playful image of space-time, 
stretched between ‘I’ and ‘it’, ego and id: ‘I come back to the geography of it’. 
‘I come back’ could mean I come back in time—I come back mentally, in 
memory—I return to that subject. It could also mean, I come back through 
space, cut across space, to space—‘to the geography of it’. The idea that the 
poet is coming rather than going is also significant: in turning to ‘it’—
whatever it may be—he also turns to us. He doesn’t turn his back (doesn’t go) 
but includes us. 
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 ‘the land falling off to the left’: the intimate language of local 
geography invites us to recall our experience of similar landscapes—or, if you 
will, the experience of the insistent localism of landscape, the way it, in 
Creeley’s terms, ‘surrounds us’.97 The playfulness, a sense of intellectual 
intrigue, is augmented by the use of the term geography—a word that seems 
to foreground its conceptual nature for a moment before it comes down to 
earth. 
This leads into a richly evocative passage that might almost have come 
out of Robert Lowell’s Life Studies or Thomas Gray’s ‘Elegy Written in a 
Country Churchyard’—except that the image of darkness falling, the 
inevitable closing of the day, seems to be more about basking in the afterglow 
of summer than ruminating on the inevitability of death. There is a hearty 
acceptance of parental sexuality: 
     my father, 
a man for kicks, came out of the tent roaring 
with a bread-knife in his teeth to take care of 
a druggist they’d told him had made a pass at 
my mother, she laughing 
Castration anxiety, or the memory of it, is neatly sublimated here into a 
comic-book recollection of his father, whose ‘tak[ing care’ is a double-edged 
sword. The act of displacement (the threat to the druggist) allows the speaker 
to share his mother’s laughter. These warm recollections are separated into 
two verse paragraphs by two more lines of simple local geography—the poet 
getting his bearings, fitting himself to the place and to his memory of the 
place: 
To the left the land fell to the city, 
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to the right, it fell to the sea 
There is also here I think an inescapable awareness of the space of the page—
the geography of that—of left and right margins—of the position of poem and 
poet between land and sea. Throughout Maximus Olson mines the idea that 
the edge of the poem, the lines’ end, constitutes a kind of land’s end (‘a 
coast/is not the same/as land’98), with the page as sea, ocean, Okeanos.99 The 
significance of these identifications, or rather complications, becomes more 
pronounced as the poem proceeds. The poem’s centre of gravity balances tip-
toe in the audible caesura that is a feature of both these lines.  
 ‘Letter 27’ then changes tack, launching into a vindication of its organic 
evolutionary necessity—‘no bare incoming/of novel abstract form’—of the 
indivisibility of form and content: which is to say, ‘This’ (three times in four 
lines). Yet ‘this’ means not only the poem: it opens to include everything, 
familial and cosmological (‘those antecedent predecessions, the precessions’), 
that has brought poem and poet to this point: ‘the generation of those 
facts/which are my words’. We then pick up the verb ‘coming’ again from the 
opening lines (‘I come back’; ‘we came home’; ‘father . . . came out’), which 
had also been echoed in ‘incoming’: 
it is coming 
 
from all that I no longer am, yet am, 
the slow westward motion of 
 
more than I am 
Here Olson runs together the motion (and rotation) of planets, seas, explorers, 
history, generation, the human body—‘animal tranquility and decay,’ as 
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Wordsworth has it100—setting them all at the same time in a kind of exquisite 
counterpoint with the rightward (eastward?) motion of the verse and adding 
up to something like an effect of slow motion. 
 Yet these lines are also, inarguably I think, a description not only of the 
motion and rhythm of the verse, they are a perfect description of the act of 
writing itself, as so beautifully described by Stanley Cavell, for example, as 
the practice of holy living and holy dying—the giving up of oneself to one’s 
work, and the giving up of one’s work as the re-hearse-ing of mortality—the 
thousand deaths of any author.101 
 The acceptance of death and disintegration (‘no Greek will be able to 
discriminate my body’), of death not as closure but as yet another opening, 
gives way to a remarkable statement of the unexceptional nature of all 
exceptionalism (the special in what is otherwise merely ‘spatial’), American or 
otherwise; that is to say, the simple complexity of all particularity: 
An American 
is a complex of occasions, 
themselves a geometry 
of spatial nature. 
Especially fine here is Olson’s hovering wordplay, as we are momentarily 
tempted to refer ‘themselves’ back to ‘An American’, revealing the plural in 
the singular, in something like the manner of Frank O’Hara’s ‘In Memory of 
My Feelings’ (easily O’Hara’s most Olson-like poem), while ‘complex of 
occasions’ sounds like the untidier, more concrete complications.102 
I have this sense 
that I am one 
with my skin. 
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One would not have thought that there was any more mileage left in punning 
on ‘sense’ but Olson’s vernacular steals another march on us, evoking the skin 
as an organ of sense-perception (touch). The off-rhyme of ‘one’ and ‘skin’ 
(which builds on the preceding covert off-rhyme with the en of ‘sense’) draws 
attention also to the oneness of the skin—which contains (to use another 
Olsonian term), if anything does, the oneness of the body, and thus plays 
against the immediately preceding image of the body’s diffusive pluralizing 
history (‘occasions’). ‘Polis/is this’, the poem will end by saying—meaning 
‘polis’ is the ‘geometry’ of singular and plural; it is what gives them shape, 
the equilibrium of both in a given life, a given poem. 
‘Each man does make his own special selection from the phenomenal 
field’, Olson writes, but each ‘particular act of individuation’ matters less for 
what it says about each man’s personality than for what it reveals about act 
and process.103 Individuation in other words is part of the process—but it is not 
the aim or the end of it. 
I . . . cannot satisfy myself of the gain in thinking that the process by 
which man transposes phenomena to his use is any more extricable 
from reception than reception itself is from the world. What happens at 
the skin is more like than different from what happens within. The 
process of image . . . cannot be understood by separation from the stuff 
it works on. Here again, as throughout experience, the law remains, 
form is not isolated from content . . . And if man is once more to 
possess intent in his life, and to take up the responsibility implicit in 
his life, he has to comprehend his own process as intact, from outside, 
by way of his skin, in, and by his own powers of conversion, out 
again.104 
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Energy comes from the transposition of phenomena—their conversion from 
one part of the ‘phenomenal field’ to another. But the poem is not alone in 
transposing phenomena. Energy—the conversion of one thing to another 
thing or else to another state—is the nature of the world. The poem doesn’t 
move the world by itself; it discovers it to move and by so discovering joins in 
the movement. The skin, for Olson, does not separate us from the world but 
connects us to it. It doesn’t shut us off from energy and experience but on the 
contrary makes them available. It is not a barrier but a ‘power of conversion’. 
 Whatever one thinks of this as physics or phenomenology, what 
remains fascinating is the prominence of the role that Olson gives to the skin. 
Part of what he is saying is that reception is active. In the nineteenth century 
one might have spoken, Emerson-like, of the constitutive action of the mind—
meaning that the mind is not just a passive receptacle of empirical data or 
Lockean ideas. The interest as regards Olson is that he gives this constitutive 
role not to the mind but to the skin—the constitutive action of the skin. No less 
interestingly, he identifies (transposes? converts?) the skin of the body with 
(into) something like the skin of the body of the poem; that is to say, the form 
of the projective poem is skin-like—the line’s end a figure for the skin as 
boundary, the line beyond which something inside is converted, 
energetically, to something outside and vice versa. So when Olson says that 
‘forever the geography/. . . leans in/on me’ he is saying that it penetrates his 
skin. (He is also saying that he must resist any nostalgia for the personal 
history in which that geography is suffused: he who has ‘come back’ must 
thus ‘compell’ what was back ‘backwards’—holding fast thereby to the 
present.) 
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 Thus Olson reaffirms what the poem has already said: that for the 
duration of the act of writing he is one with both his body and his poem—a 
process which of course cannot last: like his ancestors in Gloucester he must 
‘yield,/to change’. Or, to put it another way, like the Ancient Greeks one dies 
(‘this,/Greeks, is the stopping/of the battle’)—and one does not . . . ‘I come 
back’: meaning, I am reincarnated; or rather one is, or part of one is. ‘Polis/is 
this’: which is to say, it is also this: it is everything in the ‘phenomenal field’—
the battlefield—life and death.105 The poem is there and not there—what it 
comprises all but interchangeable with what it does not. We are all, poet and 
all, interchangeable to that extent with Greeks, a state we might think of as a 
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